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Computational technologies have significantly 
expanded the horizons of aesthetic creation; 
nonetheless, their wider ontological status as tools 
remains poorly understood. This limitation hinders our 
ability to assess their true impact on aesthetic 
practices and limits our means to establish the 
relationship between computer generated artefacts 
and previous forms of ‘media’. This paper argues that 
understanding and categorising the things 
computational technologies are able to do as 
aesthetic tools also requires understanding what type 
of tools they are. Following recent insights from 
philosophy of information and post-phenomenology, 
this paper begins by showing computational 
technologies are no ordinary mediators, but truly 
‘multi-stable’ appliances which are leading us to 
reformulate our very notions of reality and self-
understanding. While delivering a fully-fledged 
ontological model falls outside of its scope, this paper 
nonetheless suggests that within aesthetic contexts, 
computational devices may be initially described as 
information modelling appliances. This 
characterisation offers an alternative to their 
increasingly less adequate portrayal as ‘media’. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
It took computers approximately 3 decades to evolve 
from specialised single-task mainframes for 
administrative, financial and scientific tasks, to 
personal programmable appliances for the 
technologically inclined. A couple of decades later, our 
relationship with these systems has become one of 
dependency, provided that some form of 
computational technology is now present anywhere 
from our buildings to our wrists. In the process, it has 
transformed everything we do and how we do it; but 
more importantly, it is changing how we represent 
and think about our world and ourselves. Computer 
systems (i.e., the conjunction of hardware and 
software) have become our utmost ‘intellectual tools’ 
(Dyson, 1997), for they allow us to model and objectify 
every single process we are able to formulate 
algorithmically, including aesthetic artefacts. Being 
truly multi-purpose devices, computer systems have 
also become our first ‘metamedium’ (Manovich, 2013) 
for audio-visual representation and simulation. 
Understandably, many contemporary practitioners 
have adopted them as their primary tools for creation. 
But while this change has greatly broadened the 
horizons of aesthetic possibilities, our scholarly 
grasping of this technology remains comparatively 
limited. 
Arguably, the most basic questions summoned by the 
entrance of computational technology (i.e., any 
artefact or process involving computation) into the 
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realm of aesthetic creation are: (a) what are the 
artefacts it produces, and (b) how they relate to 
previous forms of representation. Being fundamentally 
ontological, both problems involve some form of 
rational description and categorisation. While most 
contemporary views approach the first problem by 
classifying computer generated aesthetic artefacts as 
some form of ‘new media’, the second problem 
invokes greater disagreements. The most common 
being whether ‘new media’ constitutes a truly 
(ontologically) distinct form of representation, or a 
mere re-iteration of ‘old media’; and whether its 
widespread adoption and development signals the 
debacle of audio-visual tradition. Defending an 
ontological kinship between old and new media on 
the basis of their formal resemblance, models such as 
the one developed by Bolter & Grusin (2000) see no 
compelling reason to regard the later as anything but 
a ‘remediation’. In recent years, however, more 
pragmatic approaches (see Fuller, 2008; Manovich, 
2013; Mateas, 2005) argue such misconception is 
symptomatic of the humanities’ long-standing 
disregard for the material and technical conditions 
behind new media, while noting that software has 
effectively become the medium of a new audio-visual 
language. 
In this paper I argue that, while acquiring a basic 
understanding of how computational technologies 
work is fundamental to comprehend and analyse the 
artefacts they generate, it is equally important to 
investigate what kind of instruments they are. By 
showing that computer systems are no ordinary 
‘tools’, I argue that understanding their ontological 
nature as an unprecedented form of technology is 
crucial for understanding their impact on aesthetic 
creation and their place as aesthetic tools. Following 
insights from the philosophy of technology and 
philosophy of information, the analysis begins by 
locating computer systems as a ‘third order’ 
technology (Floridi, 2013) before addressing why we 
need to pay attention to their ‘multi-stabilities’ 
(Selinger, 2014; Verbeek, 2005) and why they 
constitute the ‘quintessential’ (Floridi, 2009a) form of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT). 
Moreover, while challenging the primacy of the notion 
of media as a de facto descriptive category for 
computational technology in the context of aesthetic 
creation, this paper sketches a description of 
computer systems as the ultimate ‘modelling 
machines’. Finally, it invites the reader to regard 
computational technologies not simply as mediators 
of reality, but as its actual builders, and to ponder the 
potential implications following such shift. 
2 | THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY 
In his 1998 essay, Being Digital, Nicholas Negroponte 
declared the ‘Digital Revolution’ was ‘over’, arguing 
computers would become so common as to make 
digital technology ‘noticed only by its absence’. 
Furthermore, he advised against paying too much 
attention to technicalities such as the exponential 
growth in bandwidth, processing power and storage 
capacity; claiming instead that the ‘really surprising 
changes’ would be ‘happening elsewhere’: in how 
these appliances would transform science, industry 
and society. But while many of these predictions have 
crystallised, the revolution is not over; it is thriving. 
First of all, binary code is not the only digital code: the 
alphabet and the Roman and Arabic numerals are 
also digital codes (see Lopes, 2010); therefore, 
digitisation per se is not necessarily something 
revolutionary. Secondly, the transformations 
experienced by humanity over the last decades 
cannot be reduced to the fact that our technologies 
became overwhelmingly digital. The truly revolutionary 
aspect is that information revealed itself as a ’key 
resource’ (Floridi, 2010) —as the ‘steam engine of our 
times’ (Frank, 2013), and that we realised it holds the 
potential to transform not only our economy and our 
society, but also our long-standing metaphysical 
frameworks. 
2.1 A DIFFICULT NOTION 
Devising and using tools in a systematic manner is a 
distinctive (although not exclusive) human trait; we 
have been doing it for millennia and it would be 
difficult to overstate its influence over our evolutionary 
success. But even though ‘technology’ is nominally a 
Greek word, the concept itself is fairly recent both in 
origin and use. Coined in 1802 by Johann Beckmann 
(see Kelly, 2010), the term only became popular in the 
second half of the Twentieth Century[1]. Its 
resurgence coinciding with the dawn of the Space 
Race and the ‘Computer Age’, which may explain 
why computer systems are so often referred to simply 
as ‘technology’ – and, more recently, as 'tech'. From 
 CITAR Journal, Volume 7, No. 1 – Special Issue: xCoAx 2015 
 CITAR JOURNAL 
 9 
a scholarly perspective, the synecdoche is historically 
and conceptually problematic; a fact which does not 
prevent a considerable number of analyses from 
overlooking it. This tendency, however, cannot be 
attributed solely to some scholars’ reluctance to clarify 
their understanding of the term, but perhaps to its 
inherent haziness and – more importantly – to its 
complex relationship with culture. 
2.2 A CULTURAL SHIFT 
Over the last decades technology has grown to 
become the ethos of mainstream cultural expression. 
Arguably, the ‘liberation’ of computational technology 
into consumer society at the end of the 1970s was 
largely responsible for the emergence of what Kelly 
(1998) describes as ‘nerd culture’: ‘a pop culture 
based on technology for technology’. Somewhat 
following C. P. Snow’s (2000) lesser-known 
idealisation of a – scientifically literate and yet 
artistically sensible – ‘third culture’, Kelly argues 
‘nerdism’ is more than a mere fad or naïve pop 
‘celebration of engineering’. According to his 
description, nerdism is an offspring of science and 
therefore holds a general respect for its authority. 
Nonetheless, unlike its forefather, the objective of 
nerdism is not to reveal ultimate truths about Nature 
and the Universe, but to explore the potentially 
endless novel experiences offered by technology. 
Consequently, members of this culture are avid 
testers and tinkerers, they are early adopters of 
gadgets and algorithmic processes; their heroes are 
contemporary ‘tech’ moguls (e.g., Steve Jobs, Bill 
Gates, Elon Musk, Stephen Wolfram) and all-around 
‘geeks’ (Nicola Tesla or Douglas Engelbart). Above all, 
Nerd culture is pragmatic; it does not proceed from 
theory, but from practice and improvisation. Its 
members approach problems not through axioms but 
through adaptive modelling; their willingness to 
experiment is endless as long as the potential solution 
involves some form of technological development, 
their haphazard attitude sometimes resembling 
vanguardist unorthodoxy and playfulness. Needless to 
say, many nerds are also designers, developers, 
creators, and artists. 
3 | SOME THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
Oversimplifying, (an) ontology is a method for rationally 
understanding (see Poli, 2010), describing, defining, 
categorising, and making sense of entities (and their 
relationships) within a particular knowledge system 
(see Smith, 2004). Ontology is fundamentally a 
descriptive strategy, which – as hermeneutics – is 
frequently (albeit unknowingly) employed within 
aesthetic contexts. Nonetheless, for decades, both 
artists and scholars have outsourced the conceptual 
frameworks guiding their interpretations of ‘media’ —
but also of science and technology – to other regions 
of the humanities (see Wilson, 2002). Therefore, their 
views have been heavily informed by the outlooks of 
‘social relativism’ (Bogost, 2012), critical theory, and 
media philosophy. As a consequence, most analyses 
of computer generated artefacts coming out of 
aesthetic contexts have echoed the same 
preoccupations as their theoretical sources: the 
cultural and socio-political impact of the discourses 
conveyed through ‘new technologies’. 
3.1 REMEDIATION 
Many of the resulting models privileged the analysis of 
the formal and discursive elements of audio-visual 
representations, while treating the specialised 
technical knowledge necessary to generate them as 
somewhat negligible ‘grey areas’ beyond their 
interests (see Mateas, 2005). When addressing the 
impact of computational technology and attempting to 
establish the relationship between computer-
generated aesthetic artefacts and previous forms of 
audio-visual representations, their strategy remained 
virtually unchanged. One of the best-known models 
following this tradition is ‘remediation’ (see Bolter & 
Grusin, 2000), which argues there is no significative 
(ontological) difference between traditional (printed 
and electronic) and ‘new’ (computer-generated) 
media. In their view, the latter is but the latest 
‘refashioning’ of old media and therefore has the 
same purpose as all forms of representation since the 
Renaissance: to ‘put the viewer in the same space as 
the objects viewed’ (p. 11) while simultaneously 
concealing the factuality of their intermediation. 
3.2 SOFTWARE STUDIES 
Unlike remediation, the more recent Software Studies 
approach recognises an ontological distance between 
‘traditional’ and ‘new media’. Subscribing to the views 
of early personal computing pioneers, it portrays 
computers as a ‘metamedium’ (Kay & Goldberg, 
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2003; Manovich, 2013) and software itself as the 
indisputable location of contemporary media creation. 
This approach tacitly endorses technological agency 
and chastises the humanities’ traditional disregard for 
technical knowledge associated with science and 
engineering and, in particular, of programming (Fuller, 
2008; Mateas, 2005). Authors such as Lev Manovich 
(2013), a key figure within software studies, argue the 
constantly evolving language of contemporary audio-
visual artefacts is symptomatic of software’s 
idiosyncrasies, in particular, of its ability to simulate 
not merely all previously distinct forms of media, but 
also their tools and techniques. What ultimately 
characterises this and other recent fields of analysis 
(such as video game studies) is their technologically-
centred outlook on ‘media’; their insistence on 
claiming that acquiring a basic technical knowledge is 
paramount for understanding the nature of the new 
aesthetic artefacts. Such pragmatist outlook is easily 
correlated with ’nerdism’ and, it is symptomatic of the 
generalised transdisciplinary ‘empirical’ (see Selinger, 
2014) shift in our attitude towards technology. 
4 | A METHODOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE 
Overall, the remediation model presents an even-
tempered counterweight to the hype present in most 
analyses of 'new technologies' – in particular the early 
prefiguration of Virtual Reality (VR). However, by 
concluding that 'new media' is little more than a 
rehashing of old forms of representation, Bolter & 
Grusin (2000) overlook the profound ways in which 
computational technology has transformed not only 
aesthetic creation, but culture itself. This approach 
does not consider computer generated aesthetic 
experiences, which do not necessarily rely on sheer 
audio-visual communication (e.g., haptics). 
Conversely, software studies grant computer 
generated aesthetic artefacts a new ontological 
condition and, most importantly, recognise this is due 
to their origins in a particular form of technology. But 
while their approach offers powerful insights regarding 
what software is capable of accomplishing and why, it 
does not help to understand what kind of technology 
software might be. Both remediation and software 
studies are ultimately concerned with the ontological 
nature of the output (the artefacts) generated by 
computational technology. But to understand its wider 
impact on aesthetic fields it is also useful to determine 
what kind of tools we are dealing with, and what 
makes them so different from their predecessors. 
4.1 THE ORDERS OF TECHNOLOGY 
As Floridi (2013) points out, one of the most 
elementary characteristics of technology is its 
‘inbetweeness’: its location between a potential user 
(traditionally a human agent) and an ‘affordance’[2] (an 
item in the world, whether natural or otherwise). Floridi 
suggests that according to their level of development 
and – consequently – to the chain of relationships they 
enable between users and affordances, technologies 
may be placed within 3 categories or ‘orders’. First 
order technologies are the most elementary kind: 
those which stand between a user and an (usually 
natural) affordance in the world. Although they may be 
quite complex and dependent on other technological 
systems, first order technologies may be produced by 
other “non-human animals” (p. 112). Second order 
technologies (by far the most common type) require a 
higher degree of specialisation; they are those ‘whose 
affordances are other technologies’ (p. 112). The most 
elementary example would be a screwdriver (which 
stands in between the user and a screw), while its 
paramount form is the engine. Finally, third order 
technologies are those which treat other technologies 
as users; they excise the human subject from the 
chain of interaction and hence become autonomous. 
Information Technologies (IT) and computer systems 
in particular are the utmost example of third order 
technologies. 
4.2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Information technology – also known as ‘Information 
and Communication Technology’ (ICT) – and other 
related concepts such as ‘information systems’ and 
even ‘media technology’ are difficult to characterise 
under a single consensual definition. Strictly speaking 
the concept refers to systems that merge data 
processing and telecommunications (see Mitcham, 
2004) and thus only emerged when computational 
technology assumed the roles previously assigned to 
various forms of electronic communication systems 
(which include everything in between the telegraph 
and TV). However, under a broader understanding, IT 
could refer to any system used to communicate and 
store information – as Floridi (2009a, 2010) argues, 
this would push its origins back to the invention of 
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writing and, therefore, of history. It follows the so-
called ‘information age’ did not begin with computers 
but some 5,000 years ago and, consequently, that 
humanity has experienced not one but many 
information societies (see Floridi, 2010). Throughout 
its existence, IT has served three basic functions 
(Floridi, 2009a); each one associated with a particular 
historical stage. The period spanning from the earliest 
written records to the arrival of the printing press 
represents the evolution of recording. The next stage, 
communication, began with the invention of 
telegraphy and continued through subsequent 
electronic technologies or ’media’: cinema, radio, and 
television. The third stage began with the arrival of 
computers, the moment where ‘IT acquired its new 
meaning, the one we currently associate with it, as it 
came to refer to a technology used to elaborate 
information by processing data electronically and 
automatically’ (p. 228). Contrary to what some media 
scholars stipulate, with each iteration, IT did not 
replace its predecessors, but rather incorporated their 
functions [3]. In the last three decades, computational 
technology has been steadily assuming virtually every 
function that was previously scattered throughout 
various dedicated technologies and, in the process, 
has developed new ways to implement them. 
Computational technology thus constitutes the 
‘quintessential IT appliance’ (p. 228). 
4.3 TECHNOLOGY’S ‘MULTI-STABILITY’ 
Also underlining technology’s ‘inbetweeness’, ‘post-
phenomenology’ – the phenomenological take on 
‘post-humanism’ as Italian philosopher and game 
designer Stefano Gualeni (2014) describes it – 
contends that technologies are the inescapable 
interlocutors between humans and the world, 
because all human perceptions are already mediated 
by some form of technology [4] (see Gualeni 2014). 
Showing a pragmatist vein, post-phenomenology 
argues technological artefacts do not have intrinsic 
properties or essence because their meanings as 
objects are entirely dependent on the context of their 
use. Following Bruno Latour’s (1993) ‘actor-network 
theory’, post-phenomenology sees the technology as 
mutually constitutive with human users. Given the 
biconditional nature of this relationship, philosopher 
Don Ihde, a key figure in the development of post-
phenomenology, argues we cannot speak about 
technology independently of the humans using it, for if 
the tools are ‘divorced of human practice’ they 
become but ‘junk lying about’ (cited in Verbeek, 2005, 
p. 112). This context-dependency clause determining 
the identity of technological artefacts is what Ihde 
refers to as ‘multi-stability’ (in Selinger, 2014; see also 
Verbeek, 2005). And it implies that, ontologically 
speaking, the ultimate nature of technological 
artefacts is necessarily undetermined because they 
may be ‘many things at once’ (Verbeek, 2005, p. 
112); they may be ‘stable’ in multiple and 
simultaneous ways [5]. 
5 | THE LARGER LIFE OF COMPUTATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
Through its unprecedented flexibility (its ability to 
simulate virtually all forms of audio-visual 
representation or ‘media’), computational technology 
has undoubtedly broadened the horizons of aesthetic 
practices. But our understanding of the ways this 
technology is transforming not only this particular 
realm but also our entire metaphysical frameworks 
(the way we think about the world and ourselves) 
remains comparatively poor. Contemporary aesthetic 
interpretation of the artefacts generated by computer 
systems recognise the role tools play in shaping 
experience. But most analyses continue to overlook 
the fact that computers are no ordinary mediators, 
and therefore tend to engage them as if they were 
another second order technology. To overcome this 
handicap it is necessary to analyse its larger life and 
how its ‘inbetweeness’ is in fact an unprecedented 
reshaping of our metaphysical commitments. 
5.1 COMPUTATIONAL DEVICES ARE NO ORDINARY TOOLS 
Computer systems are ‘universal machines’ (see 
Turing, 2004); they are (at least theoretically) capable 
of automatically solving any problem that can be first 
translated into algorithmic form. As such, their 
architecture is permanently extendible. From a 
technological standpoint, both automation and their 
truly multi-purpose nature make computer systems 
extra-ordinary and complex [6] tools. But 
computational technology is also unprecedented 
because, to borrow Floridi’s (2010) words, it 
constitutes a ‘radical new form of engineering’, which 
is ‘re-ontologising’ our world. Being the 
‘quintessential’ implementation of Information 
Technology, computer systems are changing our 
knowledge, our ethics, our self understanding and our 
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conceptualisation of reality – which has gone from 
being that which could be measured or empirically 
perceived, to anything which might be experienced 
(see Floridi, 2009b). Through these appliances we are 
able to access other possible worlds and interact with 
other (not necessarily) human agents; computational 
technology is thus ‘augmenting’ our reality. As a 
consequence, argues Floridi, our world is being 
increasingly populated by objects (cars, buildings, 
tools) that we previously regarded as ‘dead’, but are 
now becoming ‘a-live’ (artificially ‘alive’) and able to 
interact. This paradoxical reminder of pre-modern and 
non-western ontologies is perhaps the most visible 
example of why computational technology is forcing 
us to re-evaluate our modern ‘Newtonian’ 
metaphysics (see Floridi, 2010). 
5.2 COMPUTATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AS INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
While the multi-stable character of technological 
artefacts implies that their identity as particular objects 
depends largely on the context of their use, it does 
not follow that we cannot categorise them in terms of 
some shared set of characteristics. When engaging 
computational technology, most contemporary 
aesthetic analyses identify some formulation of 
‘media’ as the common denominator for both the 
tools and the artefacts they generate. But if we agree 
that a fundamental aspect of all forms of technology is 
to stand ‘in-between’ agents and affordances, using 
mediation as a defining category results in a trivial, if 
not tautological description. A more appropriate 
alternative would be to regard computers as a 
technology that, above all, generates, stores and 
communicates information. Now, replacing ‘media’ 
with a much fuzzier term would seem unwise, 
nonetheless, despite all the semantic instability of the 
term, describing computers as prime examples of 
Information Technology (IT) does helps to distinguish 
them from other ‘mediating’ technological artefacts 
(e.g., a screwdriver, which mediates the relationship 
between a human hand and a screw). Furthermore, 
this apparently innocuous shift of perspective also 
allows us to relate computational technology with 
other technologies whose purpose is handling 
information, i.e., electronic communication systems 
and writing. 
5.3 THE ULTIMATE MULTI-STABLE MODELLING MACHINE 
Computational technology is the most ‘multi-stable’ 
technology we have ever witnessed. To paraphrase 
Manovich (2013), computer systems (or rather, their 
software) are permanently extendible. They are 
communication devices, memory devices; they are 
our 'analytical engines', and our tools for 'clear 
thinking' as the British polymath Freeman Dyson 
(1997). Depending on its configuration, the same 
appliance may be used to analyse statistical data, to 
control a drone, to watch a film, or to edit a 
photograph. Like writing, computer systems are not 
only means to enhance our memory, but also to 
externalise it; they are technologies meant to process 
and communicate our thinking. But unlike writing, the 
results of this thinking may be objectified beyond 
interpretable code. Computers are modelling 
appliances that rely on information – i.e., well-formed, 
meaningful and truthful data (Floridi, 2004) – as their 
raw material. Computers allow us to experience and 
interact with other possible worlds; the 
epistemological and aesthetic possibilities of such 
'augmented ontologies' (see Gualeni, 2014) are 
beyond anything we ever imagined. Computers are 
the ultimate tinkering devices. They are the 
pragmatists' dream machines. 
6 | A LOADED CONCEPT 
For decades, the go-to category to describe both 
computer systems and their outputs has been either 
‘media’ or one of its multiple variations. But while 
mediation is certainly a core function of computational 
technology, so it is of all technologies. Media is a high 
frequency but low content term; as a conceptual tool 
its own ‘multi-stability’ plays against its descriptive 
power. Understanding what kind of tools 
computational technologies are from the perspective 
of aesthetic creation requires both a theoretical and a 
methodological shift away from the constant 
rehashing of media-centred theories. A good starting 
point would be to ask what is it that we mean when 
we talk about media and whether the concept is 
theoretically sufficient for describing the tools and 
artefacts produced by computational technology. 
From a methodological perspective it would be useful 
to expand our research of computational technology 
beyond its particular use as an aesthetic tool, for it is 
in its wider multi-stable life that the clues leading to its 
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understanding rest. Moreover, given the constantly 
evolving nature of information technology at large, and 
the permanently extendibility of computer systems, a 
potential ontological model would require the same 
degree of flexibility and extendibility. This requires a 
strong ontological commitment, a core architecture 
over which to proceed and build future analyses; a 
kind of flexible ‘source code’ able to withstand 
extreme ‘debugging’ without falling apart. A good 
starting point would be to situate computational 
technology within a larger critique of its extended 
form: information technology. 
7 | CONCLUSIONS 
Computers are no ‘ordinary’ tools for art because they 
are no ‘ordinary’ technology at all. As a third order 
technology en route to acquire exponentially more 
autonomy (if not true intelligence), these tools are no 
longer passive mediums for conveying aesthetic 
information, but actual agents capable of generating 
novel forms of experience. Computational technology 
cannot continue to be regarded as a mere 
intermediary between our supposedly pristine gazes 
and the world, but as the actual entities responsible 
for shaping it. Computer systems are not the first, nor 
will they be the last form of information technology. 
Our ‘smart’ devices substituted 1990s PCs, and they 
in turn will be replaced by increasingly more 
sophisticated third order technologies (i.e. artificial 
intelligence, biorobotics, etc.). The challenge is thus to 
develop not an ontology of computer systems as 
artefacts, but one that encompasses computational 
technology at large as a modeller of information. From 
the point of view of aesthetic analysis this provides a 
twofold advantage: on the one hand it offers a means 
to understand what kind of tools are we dealing with 
(modellers, not simple mediators); on the other, it hints 
the ‘stuff’ this tools transform: information itself. 
ENDNOTES 
[1] It is even absent from Vannevar Bush's (1945) 
highly influential article, As We May Think. 
[2] Floridi notes the concept of 'affordance' already 
has an established technical connotation —
presumably the one Gibson (1986) imbued on the 
term – but that he is using the word in a slightly 
different sense. 
[3] It is fair to remember that McLuhan (1994) and 
Bolter & Grusin (2000) have more or less made the 
same point. 
[4] A view shared by Kittler (1999, p. 203) who, 
quoting Nietzsche, reminds us that 'our tools are also 
working on our thoughts'. 
[5] In a sense, aesthetic examples of multistable 
artefacts are appropriation art pieces; since they 
acquire entirely different meanings through what 
anthropologist Granés (2011) calls 'discursive 
alchemy'. 
[6] As McLuhan (1994, p. 356) argued, complexity is 
inversely proportional to specialisation. 
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